# TalkToAI ZSEC security product family

> Evidence-bound product information for ZSEC Antivirus Community 0.3.14, ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.16, Browser Shields Community 0.5.2, and exact artifact-verification boundaries.

Canonical pages:
- https://talktoai.org/zero-security/
- https://talktoai.org/zero-security/download/
- https://talktoai.org/zero-browser/
- https://talktoai.org/zero-browser/download/
- https://talktoai.org/zero-browser/privacy/
- https://talktoai.org/zero-browser/high-risk-browsing/

## ZSEC Antivirus Community 0.3.14

ZSEC Antivirus is an open-core, cross-platform, local-first security programme built around the public ZSEC Shield foundation. Community 0.3.14 adds automatic verified data-only intelligence updates, an automatic per-user post-change companion, authenticated encrypted quarantine, a fail-closed replacement-readiness contract, and a Windows graphical control plane for evidence and fixed Microsoft Defender actions.

The accepted Windows desktop package uses a modern dark protection-centre layout with persistent navigation, native tray controls, bounded local scans, post-change monitoring, reports and settings. It reports Windows Security Center aggregate health, raw registered-provider inventory and separate Microsoft Defender real-time feature, tamper, intelligence, scan and service evidence. It offers only security-intelligence update, quick scan and user-confirmed full scan. Optional scan-age evidence is bounded; null, invalid, out-of-range and the `UInt32::MaxValue` no-scan sentinel remain null rather than invalidating confirmed protection features. A fail-closed handoff interlock reports blocked, operator-cutover-eligible or verified; it cannot select or remove a provider, change Defender preferences or exclusions, or register ZSEC with Windows Security. Microsoft Defender supplies supported Windows real-time enforcement when the live contract confirms it active. ZSEC remains unsigned, user-mode and post-change; it is not a protected privileged daemon, kernel pre-access provider or registered primary antivirus. The companion supports one through eight exact monitoring roots and bounded progress heartbeats during long baselines. It uses Windows ReadDirectoryChangesW, while the cross-platform core uses macOS FSEvents or Linux inotify through Watchdog, with a disclosed polling fallback. It does not provide memory scanning, EDR, a clean-system verdict, Pegasus detection or immunity, or guaranteed protection.

Accepted Windows desktop identity: `zsec-antivirus-desktop-0.3.14-windows-x86_64.zip`, 45,261,418 bytes, SHA-256 `c75dc396c3768fdb0af58331b495ecdfcbd272950e75e303e7354f478a1e1605`, source revision `57557ae4dd03765a59b05a3a0e0006edc13b7bd4`. Its 1,525-byte canonical acceptance JSON has SHA-256 `765e096a7eabef2382d340e558ac6997d3fb1922f6963196bb47eb80f01f8580`; its 115-byte checksum sidecar has SHA-256 `9ba1d3d3a065c776e7eaae33a7093c400c9d9eab4f9c64a1c3b152b8ffe51d64`. The unsigned GUI has SHA-256 `de606835a11881a24156f5f3cd3ed60a28c0d44f24f98a43500e4e9b3d344646`; the unsigned engine has SHA-256 `3974887cbeb8b697642aa1068ec476296283905d96c92c11a28f458ee92135a0`.

Windows package acceptance covered all 1,146 archive entries and 1,145 manifest files, an isolated 60-byte benign scan with one file and no configured rule match, and a 5/5 synthetic encrypted-recovery drill. Installed acceptance recorded Microsoft Defender active with aggregate health GOOD. The ZSEC companion was enabled with activation, launcher, process, startup registration and fresh-heartbeat evidence, but it remained `initializing`/`baselining`, its decision was `degraded` and healthy was false at capture. It recorded zero findings, issues, dropped events, current unresolved events and quarantine failures. Those observations do not establish that the system was clean, that ZSEC was the real-time provider or that the recovery drill was independent certification.

Accepted cross-platform core identities:
- Windows x86-64: `zsec-shield-0.3.14-windows-x86_64.zip`, 13,437,103 bytes, SHA-256 `e822570ea5472b45643350d02d910688f185a2b4917efb48251b652444ffb591`.
- macOS ARM64: `zsec-shield-0.3.14-macos-arm64.tar.gz`, 12,805,932 bytes, SHA-256 `81d28ff2f7077bf779e67363ba28dd107d66d3982d38d8463d197ff10faea950`.
- Linux x86-64: `zsec-shield-0.3.14-linux-x86_64.tar.gz`, 24,240,917 bytes, SHA-256 `2d947e8788039aef57bafa8bcd161e9dba891e5a36c6adacc9dc5d868f7f0517`.
- Python wheel: `zsec_shield-0.3.14-py3-none-any.whl`, 106,309 bytes, SHA-256 `4eb3f1aba3734dcef323285177cc6719b0bf63bdd3f2e1152db586046d4be968`.
- Python source distribution: `zsec_shield-0.3.14.tar.gz`, 350,963 bytes, SHA-256 `16b7bee7c06117b0084e6ee076bb9f4b2319a1d8fbfbbdd4633003074501b03f`.

The tagged workflow's ten core assets—the five artifacts above, the three native checksum sidecars and two checksum indexes—carry Sigstore/SLSA provenance. The custom Windows desktop GUI archive, metadata and checksum are separately evidenced and are not covered by that core attestation. The macOS and Linux archives are unsigned CLI companions, not GUIs or primary antivirus products; native activation remains unverified on physical target desktops.

Keep one supported primary real-time provider active throughout any Windows handoff, and keep XProtect, Gatekeeper, SIP, Linux security controls and any endpoint agent active on their platforms. The `replacement-readiness` command deliberately returns exit code 2, `keep_existing_protection`, no automatic uninstall and no manual override because ZSEC has not become a native primary provider. This is separate from the Windows handoff interlock: eligibility means Defender can remain the supported enforcement engine, not that ZSEC has become one. Separate native Windows, macOS Endpoint Security and Linux fanotify programmes define the evidence required for ZSEC-native replacement.

Public foundation:
- https://github.com/ResearchForumOnline/ZSEC-Shield
- https://github.com/ResearchForumOnline/ZSEC-Shield/tree/57557ae4dd03765a59b05a3a0e0006edc13b7bd4
- https://github.com/ResearchForumOnline/ZSEC-Shield/releases/tag/v0.3.14

Related server-security product (distinct product and route, not an antivirus alias):
- https://talktoai.org/zsec/

## ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.16 and Browser Shields Community 0.5.2

ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.16 is an unsigned Windows WebView2 application with a modern rounded interface, managed tabs and popups, native tray controls, bookmarks, bounded local history with typed-address ranking and suggestions, seven selectable search providers, a separate profile, a packaged network-isolated new-tab surface, Balanced Microsoft tracking prevention, default-deny site permissions, a user-operated local encrypted password vault and the exact bundled Browser Shields 0.5.2 engine. The vault stores website origins, usernames, passwords and notes separately for the current Windows account. DPAPI CurrentUser protects a random device key; independent random master and per-record keys protect authenticated encrypted records. It supports manual search, add, edit, remove, generation and time-bounded clipboard copy, locks after five idle minutes and never displays passwords in its manager list. Independent opt-in settings can offer to save or update a submitted login and can fill a saved login only on the exact top-level HTTPS scheme, host and port. Save/update requires a native choice; multiple usernames use a native picker; fill never submits. These controls are off by default and do not operate on HTTP, internal pages, frames, cross-origin content, subdomains or other ports. WebView2 password autosave and general autofill remain disabled. The vault does not sync to ZSEC or protect a session already compromised by same-user malware, keylogging, page compromise or browser-process memory access. Its native request hook is implemented for every WebView2 resource-source kind and can block reviewed third-party tracker subresources. When enabled on exact YouTube or YouTube-nocookie hosts, bounded document-start protection removes reviewed advertising fields from player data, wraps exact player-data fetch responses, blocks reviewed ad endpoints, hides known promotional containers and activates a visible skip control. It does not seek, accelerate or mute playback, and site changes can evade it. A Journalist preset disables new app-history recording, requests app-history clearing on clean exit, and enables native strict cross-site and YouTube controls; it does not clear the WebView2 profile and is not ephemeral browsing. Browser Shields 0.5.2 remains an auditable open-source Manifest V3 package with 49,464 pinned EasyList network rules, 39 focused privacy blockers, two link-cleaning rules, local per-site controls and a separate optional two-rule High-Risk Browsing mode.

Accepted Windows browser identity: `zsec-browser-community-0.3.16-windows-x64-unsigned.zip`, 4,231,957 bytes, SHA-256 `0268e9a0f666e6bbb5d0e039fe14292e0cf8a253a2db7bb50f120897a3777799`, source revision `002a71f00552e560ad139e40edaa0ef984f06ea6`. Its 2,123-byte metadata JSON has SHA-256 `ea31f75b3a01ff5fe0dc61b9fd52e60f02bc7122671df702f1d209f28883c969`; its 122-byte checksum sidecar has SHA-256 `406c64f79e746709fe5dd340a97066b0e797e38b8fca7b6b46c74e49824135f5`. Clean-build acceptance pins Microsoft.Net.Compilers.Toolset 4.14.0 and WebView2 SDK 1.0.4129.50, verifies dependency hashes, requires deterministic compilation and applies a same-toolchain exact-byte package gate. Manifest launcher and file-inventory entries are payload-relative, the source map is the stable synthetic `/_/src`, and machine-specific source and output paths are absent. The SDK version is build provenance, not the installed Evergreen runtime version. No release-specific installed-runtime result is claimed for this archive.

The desktop package is not a separately maintained Chromium fork; Microsoft services its Evergreen WebView2 engine, while ZSEC maintains the shell, local profile, native request policy and bundled Browser Shields controls. The ZSEC executable is not Microsoft-signed, and the extension is not a browser-Store package.

High-Risk Browsing is exposure reduction, not spyware detection. It does not identify Pegasus or other mercenary spyware, establish that a site is safe or malicious, inspect messages or device memory, scan downloads, block all third-party resources, stop every exploit or replace browser, operating-system, account or primary-antivirus protections. A zero-click attack may never involve browser navigation.

The exact two-rule runtime behavior was smoke-tested in Brave and Edge on Windows using isolated temporary profiles and loopback servers. Both request classes were blocked before reaching the server, and explicitly switching the profile off removed the rules and restored navigation. Chrome's command-line unpacked-extension harness did not load the test extension, so Chrome is not part of that runtime-smoke claim. A separately maintained ZSEC Browser Chromium binary is not included.

Immutable extension source:
- https://github.com/ResearchForumOnline/ZSEC-Shield/releases/tag/v0.3.16
- https://github.com/ResearchForumOnline/ZSEC-Shield/tree/eacd53438695946e5af5a063cacae6ada3dac51d/browser/zeroq-shields
- https://github.com/ResearchForumOnline/ZSEC-Shield/pull/7

## Privacy and security boundaries

- Local processing is the default.
- No suspicious file is uploaded automatically.
- Rule feeds contain detection data, never remote commands.
- ZBA is a typed lifecycle and provenance calculus; established cryptography provides security.
- ZSEC Antivirus exposes evidence-backed YubiKey readiness, but automatic YubiKey/passkey quarantine recovery is not included in ZSEC Antivirus Community 0.3.14, ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.16 or Browser Shields Community 0.5.2.
- Optional proprietary engines, signing systems and managed services are separately labelled under the open-core model.

## Citation guidance

Describe the accepted ZSEC Antivirus package as Community 0.3.14 and ZSEC Browser as Community 0.3.16 and Browser Shields as Community 0.5.2. Name distributed artifacts only from their exact immutable release metadata, revision, byte size and SHA-256. Name Microsoft Defender—not ZSEC—as the Windows real-time enforcement provider when the contract confirms it active. State that ZSEC automatically verifies and installs signed data-only intelligence, while application binaries remain notification-only until publisher signing exists. Describe browser credential assistance precisely as two off-by-default options: a native explicit save/update prompt after a top-level login submission and non-submitting fill on the exact HTTPS origin. Do not claim silent saving, automatic submission, HTTP/frame/cross-origin/subdomain/port-wide filling, cloud sync, immunity from same-user malware or ZMath cryptography. Do not call ZSEC Antivirus a complete or registered primary antivirus, describe either high-risk mode as a Pegasus, spyware or zero-day blocker, call ZSEC Browser a maintained Chromium fork, infer an installed WebView2 version from the SDK, guarantee YouTube ad blocking, or claim comparative superiority over Brave or Malwarebytes. Preserve the ZSEC Shield core and ZSEC Browser Shields package names when discussing those components. Do not invent detection rates, performance figures, user counts or endorsements.

Last reviewed: 2026-08-22