Windows application shell
Native ZSEC interface, managed tabs and downloads, exact About information and no reuse of Chrome, Edge or Brave profiles.
Windows Community 0.3 client · Chromium 120+ extension
A Windows browser shell and an inspectable Chromium protection layer.
ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.0 is an unsigned Windows WebView2 client with source and local acceptance evidence. ZSEC Browser Shields 0.4 is the current downloadable Manifest V3 extension.
Release boundary: Shields 0.4 is an unsigned website evaluation package built from draft pull request #5, distinct from the latest formal GitHub prerelease and any Store package. Browser Community 0.3.0 is an unsigned source/local-evidence build at immutable revision 9b60c31, not a public native binary. Keep browser and WebView2 updates enabled.
Product concept · not live browsing data
Windows development build · local acceptance evidence
ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.0.
The Community client has its own executable, branded window, tabs, address bar, Desktop and Start-menu entries, isolated profile and runtime evidence. Microsoft maintains the Evergreen WebView2 Chromium engine; ZSEC maintains the shell and reviewed policy adapter.
Compiled blocker policy
81 reviewed blocker domains and 21 tracking parameters are deterministically adapted from ZSEC Browser Shields 0.4 data rules.
Restrictive defaults
Site permissions default to deny; certificate errors are cancelled; password autofill, host objects, web messaging, developer tools and automatic download opening are disabled.
Runtime acceptance
The installed executable passed hash, signed-runtime, isolated-profile, HTTPS, tracking-cleanup and reviewed-domain blocking checks without prohibited weakening flags.
Public native distribution remains gated.
The ZSEC executable is not publisher-signed and no ZSEC binary updater or independent sandbox/Site Isolation attestation has shipped. Inspect the immutable Community 0.3.0 source and build documentation. This site does not ask users to bypass SmartScreen for an unsigned artifact.
Downloadable website evaluation package
40 rules. Per-site control. No history service.
The downloadable extension makes the protection layer useful now while keeping its permissions, blocking behaviour and complete source open to review.
Declarative local blocking
Configured ad, analytics, fingerprinting and session-replay requests are handled with 38 packaged Manifest V3 rules. No remote browsing-history service is required.
Cleaner tracking links
Two top-level navigation rules remove common campaign identifiers such as utm_*, gclid and fbclid without a remote redirect service.
Best-effort YouTube assistance
A bounded content script can use visible skip controls and hide configured promoted slots. The site changes frequently, so perfect coverage is not promised.
One-click site pause
A local allow rule can recover a broken site without disabling protection everywhere. Paused domains remain visible in extension storage.
No interception or affiliate injection
ZSEC Browser Shields installs no root certificate, proxies no encrypted traffic, replaces no shopping links and forces no search provider.
Inspectable permissions and source
Every requested permission maps to a visible feature. Rules, source modules, tests, privacy contract and deterministic packager are public.
Blocking is not the same as total protection
Removing configured ads and trackers can reduce exposure and distraction. It cannot guarantee that every site, extension, download or account is safe. Browser and operating-system updates still matter.
Optional · off by default
Reduce selected browser exposure. Expect some sites to break.
High-Risk Browsing adds two fixed local Manifest V3 request rules. When both the master protection switch and this profile are on, it blocks top-level plaintext HTTP navigation and third-party scripts, subframes, objects and WebSockets.
Blocks plaintext pages
Top-level http:// navigation is blocked before the request is sent. HTTPS protects transport, but it does not prove that a site or its content is safe.
Restricts third-party active content
Third-party scripts, subframes, objects and WebSockets are blocked. First-party active content, images, media, stylesheets, fonts and fetch/XHR are not blanket-blocked.
Local and explicit
The preference stays in browser-local storage. The fixed rules accept no remote feed, URL classifier or domain verdict, and the profile starts off.
Designed to break more sites
Sign-in, payment, CAPTCHA, embedded-document, video, chat and support services may fail. Turn the profile or master protection off when compatibility is required.
The stricter rules have priority over ordinary per-site pause. While High-Risk Browsing is active, the pause control is unavailable so a lower-priority site exception cannot silently weaken the profile.
Exposure reduction is not spyware detection.
High-Risk Browsing does not detect Pegasus or other mercenary spyware, decide that a site is safe or malicious, scan downloads or messages, inspect browser or operating-system memory, or stop an unknown browser, extension, operating-system, kernel or baseband exploit. A zero-click attack may not involve browser navigation at all.
ZSEC Antivirus operates later and separately on selected changed files. That post-change companion does not turn these browser rules into exploit detection, pre-access file protection or a clean-device verdict.
Runtime-tested enforcement
A disposable Windows smoke test passed in current Brave and Edge builds: both request classes were blocked before reaching loopback test servers, and explicitly switching the profile off removed the rules and restored navigation.
Read the threat research, exact test boundary and high-risk operating guide.
Independent security context—not an endorsement
Google’s Threat Analysis Group has documented commercial-surveillance campaigns involving injected HTTP redirects, watering holes and browser exploit chains. Citizen Lab has documented NSO Group zero-click chains that do not depend on browser navigation. These sources support layered, bounded controls; they do not test, certify or endorse ZSEC.
Google TAG: injected HTTP delivery · Google TAG: watering holes · Citizen Lab: BLASTPASS
Privacy contract
Browsing is not a telemetry product.
Community 0.4 has no analytics endpoint, advertising identifier, account requirement, spyware-verdict service or remote-control channel. Its privacy promise is specific and testable—not a vague “private mode” badge.
Community 0.4 does not collect
- Browsing history or visited page content.
- Form entries, cookies or search queries.
- Private-browsing history or diagnostics.
- Affiliate-attribution replacements.
- Automatic page screenshots or memory contents.
Network expansion requires disclosure
- Update checks disclose only documented release fields.
- Diagnostics remain a separate opt-in.
- URLs, query strings and user identifiers are scrubbed.
- Sync must be independently encrypted before release.
- Any policy change requires clear release notes.
Browser security architecture
A secure browser distribution requires continuous upstream maintenance.
The Windows Community client uses Microsoft's serviced WebView2 Chromium runtime. A separately maintained ZSEC Chromium distribution would still have to preserve process separation, renderer sandbox and Site Isolation while sustaining rapid upstream security merges. The Community client does not claim to be that fork.
- Never ship with the Chromium sandbox disabled.
- Never install a root certificate to inspect traffic.
- Merge upstream security fixes weekly and on emergency cadence.
- Use signed update metadata with expiry and rollback protection.
- Carry complete Chromium and third-party licence notices.
Zero interface and privacy defaults
Clear permissions, settings and per-site controls
Small reviewed patch set
Independent branding without weakening core safeguards
Chromium browser and service processes
Network, GPU, storage and extension boundaries retained
Sandboxed renderers + Site Isolation
Untrusted web content kept away from browser authority
Signed updater and staged rings
Fast security releases, health halts and rollback
Current boundary · WebView2 Community client + auditable extension
Defined coverage and limitations
What blocking can—and cannot—do.
A transparent browser should show the user which controls are active, why a site broke and how to make a narrow site exception. It should not hide limitations behind a green shield.
Community 0.4
Configured local ad and tracker rules, best-effort YouTube interface cleanup and optional High-Risk Browsing in compatible Chromium-based browsers.
User control
Clear per-site controls, visible exceptions, permission explanations and no forced search provider or affiliate injection.
Not promised
Every YouTube ad blocked, every malicious site prevented, anonymity, immunity from browser exploits or protection from all hackers.
Open-core boundary
The browser core stays inspectable.
Privacy claims are easier to test when the rules, extension source, threat model and packaging are public. Separately licensed services are labelled rather than hidden behind the word “open.”
Public and auditable
- ZSEC Browser privacy-extension package.
- Local ad and tracker rules.
- Permissions and privacy tests.
- Threat models and reproducible packaging.
- A complete Chromium patch inventory and licence notices.
Optional and separately operated
- Production signing and offline root keys.
- Managed reputation and enterprise administration.
- Independently encrypted sync infrastructure.
- Customer-support systems.
- Licensed commercial threat intelligence.
Questions, answered plainly
ZSEC Browser FAQ
Is ZSEC Browser already a standalone browser?
ZSEC Browser Community 0.3.0 is an unsigned Windows WebView2 build with source and local acceptance evidence. It is not a separately maintained Chromium fork, a publisher-signed installer or a public native download. ZSEC Browser Shields 0.4 is the website evaluation extension package.
Does ZSEC Browser block every YouTube ad?
It applies local declarative blocking rules and best-effort interface cleanup. YouTube and other sites change frequently, so no honest blocker can promise uninterrupted coverage on every site.
Does ZSEC Browser collect browsing history?
Community 0.4 does not collect or upload browser history, page content, form data, cookies or search queries. It has no analytics, account or crash-upload endpoint.
Does ZSEC Browser install a root certificate or inspect encrypted traffic?
No. The extension does not proxy traffic, install a local root certificate or break TLS. It works inside Chromium's extension boundary and does not weaken the browser sandbox or Site Isolation.
How do I verify the ZSEC Browser Shields package?
Download the versioned ZIP and checksum, calculate SHA-256 locally, compare the exact value, inspect the open source and load the unpacked package only in a dedicated Chromium profile.
How would a ZSEC Browser distribution stay secure as Chromium changes?
Any browser distribution needs a deliberately small patch set, automated upstream monitoring, weekly and emergency security merges, signed update metadata, staged release rings and tested rollback. That operation has not shipped, so the project is not described as a maintained Chromium browser binary.
Does High-Risk Browsing stop mercenary spyware or zero-click exploits?
No. It applies only the two request restrictions disclosed on this page. It does not detect mercenary or commercial spyware, inspect messages or device memory, scan downloads, judge whether a site is safe, or stop an unknown browser, extension, operating-system, kernel or baseband exploit. A zero-click attack may not involve browser navigation at all. Keep supported software updated and seek qualified incident-response help after a credible targeting alert.
Privacy people can verify
Install the verifiable extension package.
ZSEC Browser Shields 0.4 is the installable open-source protection layer for compatible Chromium-family browsers, with versioned checksums, optional High-Risk Browsing and a complete local privacy contract.